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A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO THE
REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER MARKETS
Eric J. Pan*
INTRODUCTION
An extraordinary change took place when the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) acquired the electronic trading platform operator
Archipelago and went public as a $10 billion company. The NYSE’s initial
public offering marked the end of the NYSE’s comfortable 213-year history
as a non-profit, member-owned enterprise and the beginning of a new
period of expansion and growth into new markets. As a public company,
the NYSE took on the burden of having to pursue profits and please
shareholders in return for access to capital—capital it could use to invest in
technology and pursue mergers and acquisitions.1 In acquiring Archipelago,
the NYSE obtained an advanced electronic trading platform that would
enable it to offer, for the first time, the option to execute trades on the
exchange electronically,2 diminishing the importance of the NYSE’s
traditional trading floor.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (epan@yu.edu). An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial &
Commercial Law Symposium: Securities Market Structure and Regulation—What Does the
Future Hold? (Nov. 10, 2006). Other articles presented at that symposium were published in
Volume 1, Number 2 of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law. The
author is grateful to The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance for
financial support.
1. For a discussion of the reasons exchanges have sought to demutualize, see Caroline
Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
657, 668–72 (2001). See also Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and
Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 368
(2002) (discussing demutualization as a response to increased trading volume, technological
advancements, and competition).
2. Under the NYSE’s “hybrid” system, trades may be executed either through specialists on
the trading floor or through an automated matching system. New York Stock Exchange, Products
&
Services:
NYSE
Equities,
http://www.nyse.com/productservices/nyseequities/
1166830723427.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). The first test of the hybrid system took place
on October 6, 2006 when the NYSE removed automated-trading limits on shares of American
Express Co. and Equity Office Properties Trust. On the first day, the response time of the
exchange decreased from an average of 9 seconds to 0.3 seconds, and electronic trading
represented 97% of the trading volume of American Express and 95% of Equity Office. Gaston F.
Ceron, NYSE’s Speed Test Starts Off Well, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at C2.
3. See Aaron Lucchetti, Boos vs. Moos: NYSE Deal Gets One or the Other, WALL ST. J., Apr.
6, 2007, at A1; Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at
C1; Michael J. de la Merced, Big Board, Moving Toward Electronic Trading, to Lay Off 500, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at C3. When the London Stock Exchange (LSE) first introduced electronic
trading as an alternative to its floor trading system in 1986, the LSE trading floor closed within a
few weeks. See NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 45–46 (Little,
Brown & Company ed., 1991).
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The move to electronic trading has some symbolic implications. Often
the scene of frenetic traders swarming from one specialist station to another,
the NYSE trading floor has been a highly visible symbol of the strength and
vibrancy of the U.S. capital markets, making it a popular destination for
foreign heads of state, corporate chiefs and A-list celebrities who seek the
honor of ringing the NYSE’s opening and closing bell.4 But beyond
symbolism, allowing customer orders to move to the Archipelago platform
and away from the trading floor was an acknowledgement by the NYSE
that providing for faster and more efficient electronic trading is now
necessary to compete against exchanges and alternative trading systems
(ATSs) in the United States and Europe.
This competitive pressure has been building for years as other
exchanges invested heavily in electronic trading technology.5 In 2001, The
Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) became a public company, and, in 2005, it
acquired the trading business of Instinet, an operator of an advanced
electronic trading platform and a major competitor of Archipelago.6
Regional exchanges, like Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago abandoned
floor trading several years earlier. Several brokerage firms have purchased
ownership stakes in these regional exchanges or have set up electronic
networks to internalize orders.7 These same firms and others also have
launched trading services, such as Liquidnet Inc., Investment Technology
Group Inc. and Pipeline Trading Centers LLC, to provide alternative
trading venues for large block trades.8
Compared to their counterparts in Europe, however, the U.S. exchanges
have been playing a game of catch-up. Since the United Kingdom’s “Big
Bang”9 reforms in 1986, all major European exchanges have demutualized,
4. See Sunando Sengupta, The Trading Bell at the New York Stock Exchange (Jan. 2006)
(unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876620 (noting that having company
executives ring the opening or closing bell has little impact on a company’s share price).
5. See Hans R. Stoll, Electronic Trading in Stock Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 153
(2006).
6. See Jenny Anderson, Nasdaq to Acquire Electronic Stock Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2005, at C1.
7. In September 2006, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg and
Knight Capital purchased over 50% of the National Stock Exchange. In June, Bank of America,
Bear Stearns, E*Trade Financial and Goldman Sachs made a combined $20 million equity
investment in the Chicago Stock Exchange. And in 2005, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, UBS, Credit
Suisse, Merrill Lynch and Citadel Derivatives each acquired minority stakes in the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange. Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley are also
investors in BATS, the third-largest trading center in terms of trading volume after the NYSE and
Nasdaq. See Nasdaq’s Nemesis, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007, at 74.
8. See Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Plays the Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at C1;
Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Firms Plan New Service for Block Trades, WALL ST. J., Sep. 27,
2006, at C4. The NYSE recently announced a new venture to specialize in the handling of block
trades. Aaron Lucchetti, Shhh, NYSE Aims to Bring Back Blocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at
C3.
9. Capital City, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006, at 83.
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consolidated and introduced electronic trading technology. In 1993, the
Stockholm Stock Exchange was the first European exchange to
demutualize. Helsinki followed Stockholm in 1995, Copenhagen in 1996,
Amsterdam and Borse Italiana in 1997, Athens in 1999, and London,
Deutsche Börse (Frankfurt) and Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris)
in 2000.10
At the same time, the European exchanges have been competing for
cross-border listings, spurring efforts to attract order flow by developing
faster and more efficient electronic trading systems.11 In 1986, the Paris
Bourse introduced Cotation Assistée en Continu (CAC), and the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) introduced its Stock Exchange Automated
Quotations System (SEAQ). Since then, European exchanges have
competed for listings and trading volume by developing more advanced
trading systems that are designed to lower trading costs and increase the
speed of order matching and execution. For example, when the LSE
introduced SEAQ International, an automated quotation system for
international stocks, and threatened to attract a substantial portion of the
trading volume of German company shares, the Deutsche Börse countered
with Xetra.12 When other European exchanges appeared to draw away
business from the LSE, the LSE introduced the Stock Exchange Electronic
Trading System (SETS) for its Main Market in 1997.13
The competition for faster and more efficient trading platforms
continues today, especially as hedge funds and other institutional investors
use fast-trading computer programs to take advantage of arbitrage
opportunities.14 In 2007, the LSE announced its new trading platform
TradElect.15 TradElect shortens the amount of time to complete a trade to
ten milliseconds; this is five times faster than with SETS.16 Competing on
the basis of convenience instead of speed, OMX introduced “Genium,” one

10. See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 105–06 (2002). Several non-European exchanges also demutualized:
the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998 and Singapore, Hong Kong and Toronto in 2000. The first
U.S. market to demutualize was Nasdaq in 2000. Id.
11. See Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,
Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497 (2001).
12. See Cara Schwarz-Schilling & Mark Wahrenburg, Regulating Competition Between Stock
Exchanges 2 (Universitat Frankfurt Am Main, Working Paper, 2002), available at http://wiw.unifrankfurt.de/schwerpunkte/finance/wp/354.pdf; Marco Pagano, The Changing Microstructure of
European Equity Markets (Ctr. for Studies in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 4, 1997),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=141048.
13. See Poser, supra note 11, at 523.
14. See Norma Cohen, Headlong Scramble for Speed, FIN. TIMES REP., Nov. 28, 2006, at 4.
15. See Alistair MacDonald, LSE Puts Its Stock in Speed, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007, at C2.
16. Id.
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of the few trading platforms that can receive orders for securities,
commodities and derivatives.17
Demutualization and increased competition has led to a wave of
consolidation by the European exchanges. Euronext joined together the
Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Lisbon exchanges where companies listed
on each exchange are traded across the same order book. OMX has gone the
furthest, bringing together the Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Iceland,
Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius exchanges into a single exchange with uniform
listing rules.18 The LSE acquired Borse Italiana.19 And both Euronext and
Deutsche Börse have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to merge with the
LSE.20
Until recently, the U.S. and European markets developed independently
of each other. Competition among exchanges and from ATSs, as well as
regulatory reforms in each jurisdiction, has driven many of the changes that
have taken place. This separation of the U.S. and European markets,
however, is ending as both the NYSE and Nasdaq acquire major non-U.S.
exchanges. In April 2007, the NYSE and Euronext merged into a single
cross-border entity, named NYSE Euronext, to operate exchanges in Europe
and the United States. Nasdaq, reviving its own international aspirations,21
announced in May 2007 that it plans to acquire OMX.22 The existence of
one, and likely two, transatlantic exchanges is putting pressure on Deutsche
Börse and other European exchanges to seek new partners.23
The merger of the two largest U.S. exchanges with European exchanges
(and possibly additional mergers with exchanges in other parts of the

17. Id.
18. See generally Alistair MacDonald, Multiple Markets, One Listing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,
2006, at C14; OMX Corporate, http://www.omxgroup.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
19. Alistair MacDonald, LSE Snags Borsa Italiana, Beating Out NYSE Euronext, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 2007, at B3.
20. Alistair MacDonald, For LSE Chief Furse, Takeover-Fighting Skills Could Be Put to the
Test, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at C1.
21. In 2000, Nasdaq entered into a joint venture with the Osaka Stock Exchange to form
Nasdaq Japan, and in 2001 Nasdaq acquired Brussels-based exchange Easdaq, renaming it Nasdaq
Europe. Both ventures ultimately failed. See Silvia Ascarelli, Nasdaq Confirms its Acquisition of
Easdaq Stake, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2001, at C14; Terzah Ewing & Phred Dvorak, Japan Gets
First Taste of Nasdaq in Latest Push for Global Market, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at A21;
German Offshoot of Nasdaq Plans to End Operations, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2003, at C10.
22. See Aaron Lucchetti & Alistair MacDonald, Nasdaq Lands OMX for $3.7 Billion; Are
More Merger Deals on the Way?, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2007, at B3. Nasdaq also attempted
unsuccessfully to acquire the LSE in February 2007, but may make another attempt in the future.
As of June 2007, Nasdaq owned 30 percent of the LSE, enough to deter a competing bid and to
make another serious takeover attempt for the London market. See Alistair MacDonald & Jenny
Clevstrom, Moving the Market: Nasdaq, Nordic Exchange Holding Talks - Consolidation Fever
Revives Speculation of a Joint LSE Bid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at C2.
23. See Buy, buy, buy, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2007, at 76.
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world)24 poses a problem for U.S. regulators: How should a multijurisdictional exchange be regulated?25 The U.S. regulatory regime tightly
controls how exchanges operate, who can conduct business on the
exchanges and what are the responsibilities of exchanges to regulate market
participants. Unique to the U.S. system, these regulations cannot easily be
extended to non-U.S. exchanges. Furthermore, European governments have
shown hostility to any prospect of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) applying its regulations to the European half of a
transatlantic exchange.26
To win approval for their merger, the NYSE and Euronext announced
that they would keep their markets separate, each to be regulated only by its
respective home regulator,27 but it is unlikely NYSE Euronext will be
satisfied with this arrangement. The utmost economic benefits of the merger
will be realized only if the exchanges are able to consolidate trading into
one platform with a single order book, thereby achieving economies of
scale and maximizing liquidity. To complete such a consolidation would
require unhindered cross-border trading, where broker-dealers in the United
States and Europe would have full access to listed shares in each market.
Currently, the United States prevents a foreign exchange from
providing services in the United States without registering as an exchange
or meeting certain limited registration exemptions set forth by the SEC.
Foreign broker-dealers also cannot provide services in the United States
without meeting applicable U.S. broker-dealer regulations.28 These
limitations are the result of the SEC’s unwillingness to provide greater
flexibility in a regulatory system it believes best provides for investor
protection and market integrity.29 In this respect, U.S. regulation conflicts
24. See James Kanter, Trans-Atlantic Exchange to Be Listed Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007,
at C2 (reporting that NYSE Euronext chief executive officer John Thain announced plans to
expand operations to Asia).
25. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, UK Frets Over LSE Takeover, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006,
at C12. See also Charlie McCreevy, EU Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Serv., Public Address at The
Heyman Center for Corporate Goverance: Building the Transatlantic Marketplace (Mar. 7, 2007),
available at http://www.heyman-center.org/programs/mccreevy%20speech.pdf.
27. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Regarding Proposed Combination Between
NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3455026, 72 Fed. Reg. 814, 817 (Dec. 29, 2006); Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE
Group and Euronext N.V. Agree to a Merger of Equals (June 1, 2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1149157439121.html.
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2005). See also A Global View: Examining Cross-Border
Exhange Mergers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the
S. Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (written statement of the
SEC).
29. See Erik R. Sirri, Dir., SEC Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Speech: Trading Foreign Shares,
(Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030107ers.htm
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with the profit interests of the exchanges. Pressure will build on the SEC to
relax its regulatory framework to allow for Euronext-/OMX-listed
companies and market participants to have full access to the NYSE/Nasdaq
and vice-versa—in short, lower the barriers to the creation of a single
market.
This article examines the problem of regulating a transatlantic
exchange. This article argues that the most appropriate regulatory strategy
is a mutual recognition regime between the United States and European
Union. One appropriate model for such a regime is the recently adopted
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)—the new EU directive
that provides a regulatory structure for European markets to operate in and
among the various EU member states.30 The general MiFID approach can
be extended to allow regulated exchanges and alternative trading systems in
the United States and European Union to operate in both jurisdictions.
In setting forth the benefits of the MiFID to the regulation of crossborder exchanges, this article argues that consideration of the MiFID as a
model for the SEC is not merely an academic exercise. The MiFID’s
potential to increase the competitiveness of European exchanges compels
the SEC to incorporate some of the MiFID’s best features in the way it
regulates the operation of exchanges and other trading centers in the United
States. To this end, this article sets forth and examines three changes in how
the SEC regulates exchanges: separation of self-regulatory responsibilities
from exchange operations; redefinition of best execution in the tradethrough rule to permit exchanges to compete on a variety of services, not
only price; and the opening of the U.S. market to foreign financial services
providers, which includes allowing foreign exchanges to place trading
screens in the United States. Each of these changes will move the U.S.
markets closer to the European markets and make it easier for U.S. and
European markets to combine and share services across the Atlantic.
This article also considers the advantages and problems associated with
a MiFID-style mutual recognition regime between the United States and
European Union. To put in place the type of regime envisioned in this
article, U.S. regulators will have to reconsider some long-held views about
the role and obligations of exchanges in our securities markets. I note the
recent proposal of SEC officials Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson for
the SEC to adopt a policy of “selective substituted compliance.” While this
article applauds the proposal for its acceptance of the basic principles of
mutual recognition, it notes that the proposal does not go far enough to
resolve the regulatory differences that exist between the U.S. and European
[hereinafter Sirri Speech]; Howell E. Jackson et al., Foreign Trading Screens in the United States,
1 CAP. MKT. L.J. 54, 68–69 (2006).
30. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1–44 (EC) amended by Council Directive
2006/31/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 60–63 [hereinafter MiFID].
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markets and the task of coordinating regulation and enforcement between
the United States and European Union. Consequently, much can still be
learned from following the more ambitious blueprint for the regulation of
U.S. and foreign exchanges laid out by the MiFID.
Ultimately, the SEC must actively cooperate with EU regulators and
seek a convergence of regulation. The problem of regulating cross-border
exchanges should be viewed in the context of the SEC’s need to open up
the U.S. securities markets to more international competition. By seeking to
coordinate regulation with foreign jurisdictions, the SEC can ensure that
high standards for the protection of investors are maintained in both the
United States and European Union and that the U.S. markets remain the
most competitive in the world.
MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIRECTIVE (MIFID)
How to regulate entities across borders is an old problem for the
European Union. One of the European Union’s primary objectives since
1960 has been the elimination of national legal and regulatory barriers to
create a single European financial market.31 Just as the SEC is now thinking
about the conditions under which it will permit foreign exchanges to access
the U.S. market, the European Union has struggled for years with the
problem of how to convince its member states to open their markets to
financial services firms from other EU member states. Its first attempt at
creating a pan-European regulatory regime for financial services was the
1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD).32 The main achievement of the
ISD was to introduce a mutual recognition regime for financial-service
firms.33 This mutual recognition framework raised the prospect of qualified
firms operating freely in multiple European countries with the authorization
of only one regulator.
Most regulators and market participants, however, found the ISD to be
flawed in practice. Despite its promotion of mutual recognition, the ISD did
not stop host countries from imposing additional requirements on foreign
firms or restricting which firms could apply for mutual recognition
treatment.34 As a result, few firms were able to expand their operations to a
foreign country and compete against the already-entrenched home firms.
31. Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single
European Securities Regulator, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499, 499–500 (2003).
32. Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27–46 [hereinafter ISD].
33. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities
Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 677–78 (2001); Maria
Szonert-Binienda, Passporting Financial Services Throughout the European Union, 116
BANKING L.J. 456, 457–58 (1999). See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European
Union’s Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 181 (1994) (describing the
impact of the ISD on EU securities regulation).
34. See ISD, supra note 32.
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The ISD only covered a limited number of investment services and
products, failing to address the development of new markets like those in
derivatives, and quickly became outdated. The ISD also failed to ensure that
there was a regulatory framework to take into account both established
regulated exchanges and the existence of ATSs.35 As the ISD covered only
“regulated exchanges” (known as the “concentration rule”),36 its regime
prevented trades of listed shares from taking place on ATSs, effectively
insulating the main exchanges from any outside competition. Finally, the
ISD failed to ensure complete cooperation among the national regulatory
authorities. The ISD suffered from inconsistent implementation and did not
provide for a means of making technical adjustments to smooth out the
wrinkles of implementation once the directive took effect. Thus, firms
continued to face different regulations and barriers to operating in multiple
European countries without a formal mechanism to bridge regulatory
differences. In response to these concerns and a decision to encourage
greater competition among financial service firms, the European Union
decided to draft an improved version of the ISD. This became the MiFID.37
As a model for the SEC, five aspects of the MiFID are worth
considering in detail: the passport; scope; definitions of business conduct,
investor protection and best execution; provision of pre-trade and post-trade
transparency; and recognition of customer categories.
THE PASSPORT: MUTUAL RECOGNITION, MINIMUM
STANDARDS AND HOME COUNTRY SUPERVISION
The most important feature of the MiFID is the passport it carried
forward from the ISD. Pursuant to the passport, any investment firm or
exchange may operate in another EU member state if it has been authorized
to conduct business by the competent authority of its home country.38 The
passport itself consists of mutual recognition, minimum standards and home
country supervision.39
Mutual recognition requires that each country recognize the adequacy
of the rules and regulations of another country to permit a regulated entity
to do business in both jurisdictions. Mutual recognition depends on an
independent determination by each state that the regulatory standards, and
the subsequent enforcement of such standards, of a foreign firm’s home
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 33.
37. The European Council adopted the MiFID in April 2004. Each EU member state is to
implement MiFID no later than November 1, 2007. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 70; Caroline
Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
127, 147–50 (2005) (describing the consultation process in preparing MiFID).
38. See Niamh Moloney, Financial Market Regulation in the Post-Financial Services Action
Plan Era, 55 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 982, 987 (2006).
39. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 31, 32.
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state are satisfactory and require no additional oversight and supervision by
the host state. If there is true mutual recognition, the host country will not
impose additional requirements on the entity regulated by the foreign
jurisdiction, and the entity should have complete access to the host
country’s market. If two jurisdictions recognize each other’s market
regulations and supervisory competency, there will be a common market
even if there is not complete harmonization of regulations.
How a state determines whether another state’s regulatory standards are
satisfactory must be negotiated. This will be one of the most important tasks
in establishing a mutual recognition regime between the United States and
the European Union. In the case of the MiFID, EU member states have
become more receptive to the principle of mutual recognition because of the
Lamfalussy process, a four-level procedural roadmap set forth by the
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities
Markets.40 Under the Lamfalussy process, the broad standards agreed to by
the member states are set forth in a directive adopted pursuant to the EU
legislative process. This exposition of framework principles is considered
part of the Level 1 process. This was the same process used to adopt the
ISD. Level 2 of the Lamfalussy process provides for promulgation of
detailed implementing measures, prepared through consultation with EU
officials, the European Securities Committee (ESC) (composed of the
finance ministers from each EU member state) and the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR) (composed of representatives of
each member state’s financial regulatory authority).41 While the passage of
a directive must work slowly through EU legislative procedures, the Level
2 process, consisting of permanent committees of expert regulators with
direct authority in each EU member state, is designed to encourage more
nimble, efficient regulation-making to keep up with market developments.42
The Level 3 process consists of cooperation among regulators to ensure
proper and consistent implementation of the directive and technical
implementing measures, and the Level 4 process refers to the monitoring
and enforcement of member-state compliance with the directive and
technical implementing measures.43 Consequently, the Lamfalussy process
40. See Eur. Comm’n, Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., Final Report of the Committee of Wise
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm [hereinafter Wise
Men Report].
41. European Commission recommendations for certain implementing measures were
published on February 6, 2006. The ESC approved these measures in June 2006 with the advice of
CESR, and the measures were formally adopted on September 2, 2006. See Commission Directive
2006/73/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26 [hereinafter Implementing Directive]; Commission Regulation
1287/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 1 (EC).
42. See Wise Men Report, supra note 40, at 28–36.
43. Id. at 37–41.
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offers an opportunity for national regulators to negotiate and ensure the
implementation of certain standards.
A second passport requirement is minimum standards—those common
standards that are implemented and enforced in every country participating
in the mutual recognition regime. The existence of minimum standards
gives confidence to national regulators and market participants that the
passport will not result in a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, where market
participants engage in regulatory arbitrage to circumvent various host
country rules or requirements. The MiFID sets forth the minimum standards
that must be in place in all member states.44 In the case of past EU
directives, inconsistencies in how member states implemented the broad,
and sometimes vague, terms of directives frustrated the effectiveness of
minimum standards.45 By having national regulators participate in the EU
standard-setting process and providing more detailed and technical
instructions, the Lamfalussy process should improve how each member
state implements the MiFID and ensure compliance with the minimum
standards set forth in the directive.
At the same time, the MiFID limits the ability of member states to
impose additional requirements on investment firms. Article 4 of the
Implementing Directive provides that member states may only impose
additional requirements on investment firms if such requirements are
justified and proportionate to the relevant risks to investor protection or
market integrity.46 This limitation ensures that foreign investment firms are
not denied access to certain markets because some member states attempt to
impose additional requirements to protect domestic firms.
The final characteristic of the passport is the principle of home-country
supervision. Under the MiFID, each entity that conducts business in the
European Union is subject to the supervision of its home country.47 The
principle of home-country supervision is important in defining the
regulatory responsibility of each member state. Without an agreement on
home-country supervision, a firm may be prevented from conducting its
44. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 5–30.
45. See Michel Tison, The Investment Services Directive and Its Implementation in the EU
Member States 21–30 (1999) (Univ. of Ghent Law Sch., Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No. 199917, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=193270.
46. See Implementing Directive, supra note 41, at art. 4.
47. See, e.g., MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 5 (requiring authorization by home member state
authority) and art. 31 (requiring member states to give free access to investment firms regulated
by the competent authority of another member state). The one exception in the MiFID to the
principle of home country supervision is the regulation of branches. Under the MiFID, firms can
establish branches in other states without the authorization of the host state. The firms, however,
have to report on the operations of these branches to their home regulator who in turn must pass
on information to the host state. In addition, the host state is responsible for ensuring that the
branch of the foreign firm complies with all conduct of business, best execution, transaction
reporting and pre- and post-trade transparency obligations. See id. at art. 32.
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operations in more than one jurisdiction because of conflicting regulations
imposed by competing regulators. Either inconsistent regulations or the host
country’s imposition of additional obligations on the foreign firm could
deter entry by the firm. By imposing the primacy of the principle of home
country supervision, the MiFID resolves uncertainty regarding the
applicable regulatory authority and eliminates the regulatory barriers that
may stand in the way of cross-border operations.
SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE
The MiFID serves as a comprehensive legislative act drafted to cover
all areas of the financial services industry, making the MiFID a more
ambitious directive than the ISD. The MiFID governs any entity engaged in
the selling of securities or investment products, including investment banks,
broker-dealers, fund managers, futures and options firms, and some
commodities firms.48 The MiFID requires firms to satisfy certain corporate
governance requirements, file reports to the relevant competent authority
regarding any changes to management, maintain sufficient regulatory
capital (as set forth in the Capital Requirements Directive),49 manage any
conflicts of interest between themselves and their clients, and maintain
minimum internal controls, including risk management and outsourcing of
critical functions.50
The MiFID also covers a broader range of financial instruments than
the ISD.51 The MiFID passport now extends to services pertaining to
financial commodity derivatives, credit derivatives and other financial
contracts. 52
Most importantly, the MiFID governs the operation of both exchanges
and alternative trading systems.53 One of the deficiencies of the ISD was
that it only extended the mutual recognition passport to “regulated
markets,” as defined by each member state.54 This limitation allowed
individual member states to deny the passport to ATSs. The MiFID
removes this limitation by extending the benefits of the passport to

48. See MiFID, supra note 30.
49. See Council Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) (relating to the taking up and pursuit
of the business of credit institutions); Council Directive 2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) (relating
to the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions). Regulated markets, however,
are not subject to the Capital Requirements Directive.
50. See MiFID, supra note 30.
51. The ISD covered transferable securities, money market instruments, units in collective
investment undertakings and financial derivatives. See ISD, supra note 32.
52. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 31, 32.
53. See id.
54. ISD, supra note 32, at art. 16.
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“multilateral trading facilities” (MTFs), a term that encompasses ATSs.55
The MiFID requires MTFs to meet many of the same obligations already
required of exchanges: presentation of transparent criteria for determining
the financial instruments that can be traded on their systems, fair and
orderly trading rules and rules to allow for efficient settlement of trades and
non-discriminatory rules for access to their systems.56 Consequently, the
MiFID ensures that all markets, whether exchanges or MTFs, are subject to
the same market-integrity standards.
BUSINESS CONDUCT; BEST EXECUTION
The MiFID also puts into place new rules of conduct for investment
firms in Europe.57 The MiFID states that firms have to act “honestly, fairly
and professionally” and, in accordance with the best interests of their
clients, communicate in a way that is fair, clear and not misleading, and
provide clients with appropriate information about the firm, its services and
the costs, and associated charges.58 In addition, the MiFID puts a “knowyour-client” obligation on firms: They are required to collect information
from their clients in order to determine whether a particular service or
product is suitable to the client.59
One key area where the European Union took a different approach than
the one taken by the SEC60 is in defining the obligation of investment firms
to obtain the best possible results for their clients. Under the MiFID, a firm
is to take into consideration a range of factors in order to meet its best
execution obligation. In addition to price, the firm should consider cost,
speed, size, nature of the order and the likelihood of execution, and
settlement.61 The MiFID does not emphasize one factor over another, but
rather places the burden on the firms to develop a process for achieving best
execution.62

55. Article 4(1)(15) of the MiFID defines a “multilateral trading facility” as a “multilateral
system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple thirdparty buying and selling interests in financial instruments – in the system and in accordance with
non-discretionary rules – in a way that results in a contract in accordance with the provision of
Title II.” MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 4.
56. See id. at art. 14.
57. See Emilios Avgouleas, The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets:
Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection, 6 EUR. L.J. 72 (2000).
58. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 19.
59. Id.
60. See infra pp. 153–54.
61. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 21(1).
62. See id. at art. 21(2).
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PRE-TRADE AND POST-TRADE TRANSPARENCY
The MiFID sets forth several principles to regulate market transparency
and integrity. To mitigate concerns about market fragmentation and the
migration of order flow to non-regulated internalizers, the MiFID requires
public disclosure of certain pre-trade and post-trade information by equity
markets and “systematic internalizers” so that customers will know what
the best bids and offers for each trade are.63
First, the MiFID requires systematic internalizers to publish quotes on a
regular and continuous basis during trading hours for shares for which there
is a liquid market.64 The MiFID defines systematic internalizers as
investment firms, which, on an organized, frequent and systematic basis,
deal on their own accounts by executing client orders outside a regulated
market or MTF.65 Requiring systematic internalizers to disclose bid and
offer quotes for shares traded by systematic internalizers benefits customers
who wish to ensure they are having their trades executed at the best
available prices. As a result, systematic internalizers are forced to meet the
same obligations as the exchanges and MTFs, which already provide pretrade transparency.66
Under the MiFID, firms executing trades on a customer’s behalf must
provide more information to their customers about the terms under which
the trade was executed. The MiFID is most concerned with off-exchange
trades where the customer has less opportunity to confirm its trade was
executed on the best terms. To address this problem, the MiFID requires
public disclosure of the terms of a trade if the shares being traded are
admitted to trading on a regulated market.67
The MiFID imposes additional transparency requirements on MTFs.
MTFs must publicly report current bid and offer prices and the depth of
trading interests at these prices,68 which are advertised on their systems in
respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. Likewise, after
the execution of the trade, an MTF must make public the price, volume and
time of the trade executed on its system in respect of shares admitted to
trading on a regulated market.69 Collectively, these transparency
requirements encourage the development of a centralized order book where
bid and offer information for certain shares, whether it is found on an

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at art. 27.
Id. at art. 27(1).
Id. at art. 4(1)(7).
Id. at art. 27(1).
MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 28.
Id. at art. 29.
Id. at art. 30.
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exchange or an MTF, or provided by a systematic internalizer, is made
available to the marketplace.70
In addition, the MiFID requires regulated markets and MTFs to
supervise trading on their markets and report misconduct to the relevant
regulator. Investment firms must maintain records of all of their
transactions for up to five years so that regulators can monitor on-going
transactions and conduct investigations into fraud, insider trading and
money laundering.71
CUSTOMER CATEGORIES
The MiFID also sets different standards for each customer category.
Retail investors benefit from the heaviest protection, and firms are given
more freedom to avoid certain MiFID requirements when they conduct
business with professional clients or other sophisticated entities. For
example, the conduct of business, best execution and client order-handling
rules are waived for entities classified as “eligible counterparties.”72 The
MiFID considers, among others, investment firms, credit institutions,
insurance companies, common funds or unit trusts and pension funds
eligible counterparties.73 These entities are sophisticated enough not to need
the benefit of the MiFID’s investor protection rules, and it is expected that
they will be able to demand or negotiate their own protections as necessary.
The MiFID also allows systematic internalizers to distinguish between
retail and professional clients in executing trades in accordance with
published quotes. Professional clients include regulated financial service
providers, corporate entities of a certain size, governmental bodies and
individuals with sufficient investment experience, wealth and/or financial
knowledge.74 The MiFID permits systematic internalizers to execute trades

70. In its November 2002 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Investment Services and Regulated Markets, amending Council Directives
85/611/EEC, Council Directive 39/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive
2000/12/EC, the European Commission stated:
The operation of an integrated financial market requires that orders to buy and sell
financial instruments interact effectively, freely and instantaneously with each other on
a cross-border basis. Requiring investment firms to consider trading conditions on a
reasonable range of execution venues, and to route orders to the venues offering the
best prices, will ensure that liquidity responds quickly to price differentials.
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Investment Services and Regulated Markets, and Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC,
Council Directive 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, at 26,
COM (2002) 625 final (Nov. 19, 2002).
71. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 25(2).
72. Id. at para. 41.
73. Id. at art. 24(2).
74. See id. at Annex II.
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at prices different from published quotes when the customer is a
professional client and the trade involves amounts larger than those
normally requested by retail clients.75
POLICIES BEHIND MIFID
By all measures, the MiFID creates a comprehensive regulatory
framework for the regulation of markets in the European Union and the
formation of a single European financial market. Equally notable about the
MiFID are the policy principles that underlie many of its provisions.
First, the MiFID establishes a regulatory framework designed to
encourage cross-border competition among trading venues. MTFs now can
take advantage of the passport to provide services across Europe. Regulated
markets and MTFs now have the right to place trading screens in countries
outside that in which they are registered without pre-approval of domestic
regulatory authorities.76 At the same time, these trading venues must now
provide minimum levels of investor protection and satisfy certain pre- and
post-trade transparency requirements.77 These provisions allow regulated
markets, MTFs and systematic internalizers to compete for trading volume
on an equal regulatory playing field.
The MiFID also avoids limiting the scope of competition by allowing
trading venues to compete in best execution and client-appropriate services.
While requiring best execution of trades, the MiFID elects to adopt a broad
definition of best execution, providing ample room for trading venues to
offer a variety of options to clients.78 This means some trading venues can
provide “better” services for clients seeking price superiority, while others
may attract clients seeking execution certainty or lower administration
costs. To encourage further market differentiation, the MiFID allows
trading venues to offer different services to different types of clients.79 In so
doing, it recognizes that professional clients require less protection than
retail clients and may value different services. As a result, trading venues
will be able to offer specialized services to retail and professional clients.
Second, the MiFID recognizes the importance of regulatory cooperation
in maintaining a mutual recognition regime. The Lamfalussy process lays
out a process by which common standards can be agreed upon between
member states, but the MiFID also provides that there be sufficient on75. Id. at art. 27(3).
76. Id. at arts. 31(5), (6). See also Eur. Comm’n, Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators, The Passport
Under MiFID: Recommendations for the Implementation of the Directive 2004/39/EC and
Statement on Practical Arrangements Regarding the Late Transposition of MiFID, para. 52,
CESR/07-337b (Oct. 2007).
77. See MiFID, supra note 30.
78. Id. at para. 44.
79. See id. at para. 50 and art. 27(3).
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going regulatory cooperation to ensure continued relevance of these
regulatory standards. Regulatory cooperation consists of information
sharing, joint supervision, rights of investigation, consultation and joint
enforcement.80 The MiFID also takes advantage of the new European
institutions like CESR to coordinate regulatory responses to changes in the
market. 81
Regulatory cooperation is necessary to facilitate competition. The ISD
failed in part because it did not eliminate all of the regulatory barriers
preventing cross-operation of investment firms. Certain member states
refused to follow the spirit of the mutual recognition regime either because
of market-integrity concerns or protectionism.82 As the MiFID is just being
implemented, it is too early to tell if it will suffer from the same fate, but
the MiFID has more strongly addressed the need for regulatory cooperation.
Third, the MiFID reflects the European Union’s ambition to make the
European financial markets competitive with other markets, especially the
United States. The European Union drafted the MiFID not only with an eye
toward getting its internal markets in order, but also to give it leverage to
demand access to other markets. The MiFID explicitly denies branches of
investment firms from third countries to establish themselves or provide
services in any EU member state without assurances that EU firms will
receive reciprocal treatment in return.83 Article 15 of the MiFID provides
that member states are to inform the European Commission of any
difficulties faced by their firms when attempting to provide services
abroad.84 The Commission may direct member states to limit or suspend
any decision to authorize firms from a third country to conduct business in
the member state, and the Commission may continue to stop these non-EU
firms from doing business in the European Union until it is satisfied that
reciprocal treatment is offered by the third country. Article 15 offers the
European Union a potentially powerful tool to seek concessions from the
United States, especially with respect to allowing European firms and
exchanges direct access to the U.S. market.
RETHINKING THE U.S. SYSTEM
The difference between the EU and U.S. regulatory regimes illustrates
one important reason why the European markets demutualized, adopted
80. See, e.g., id. at arts. 49, 56, 57, 59.
81. See id. at art. 64.
82. See generally Eur. Comm’n, Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., Initial Report of the Committee
of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, at 15–20 (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/initial-report-wisemen_en.pdf (discussing the shortcomings of European regulation).
83. See MiFID, supra note 30, at para. 28.
84. Id. at art. 15(1).
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electronic trading, and consolidated more than 20 years earlier than their
U.S. counterparts. The European markets expanded and competed in a
fragmented regulatory environment where each exchange operated in
accordance with national laws and regulations. Each EU member state had
its own national exchange, and European companies frequently had their
primary listings on an exchange located in their home country.85 After
adoption of the ISD in 1993, the various national exchanges in Europe—
each still subject to their different local rules—began competing with one
another for order flow in European stocks. The introduction of the ISD
made it easier for European exchanges to extend their operations to other
parts of the European Union and compete with each other. This direct
competition eventually led to the combination of national exchanges into
multi-jurisdictional-European exchanges like Euronext and OMX and the
placement of trading screens across Europe by Deutsche Börse and the
LSE.
In contrast, the U.S. regulatory environment, until recently, has shielded
U.S. exchanges from similar pressure to innovate and compete. Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,86 and the rules and regulations
thereunder, U.S. exchanges are subject to SEC oversight and also serve as
regulators of broker-dealers, market makers and listed companies.87 As selfregulatory organizations (SROs), the established exchanges had little
incentive to adopt new trading technology or to be worried about new
entrants challenging their dominance of the trading of listed equity
securities.
The barriers to entry for new competitors were high, and the SEC
prevented foreign competitors from entering the marketplace.88 A start-up
exchange had to register first as an exchange with the SEC and take on the
responsibilities (and costs) of being a SRO. Assuming this new exchange
could meet the necessary regulatory requirements, it would be difficult for
the exchange to challenge the natural monopoly enjoyed by the established
exchanges over the trading of existing equity securities.89 At the same time,
the SEC limited the ownership of exchanges to not-for-profit organizations,
85. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 33, at 677–78.
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000).
87. For a detailed description of the operation of exchanges as self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) and the relevant rules and regulations governing SROs, please see Onnig H. Dombalagian,
Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market
System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069 (2005); Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the
Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2006); Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial
Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation during the First Seventy Years of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347 (2004).
88. See Jackson et al., supra note 29, at 58–59, 68–69.
89. In 1963, the SEC Special Study on the securities markets noted that trading volume was
migrating to the primary exchanges at the expense of the smaller regional exchanges. See
Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1083.
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limiting any new exchange’s ability to raise money from outside sources.90
It was not until 1998 in Regulation ATS that the SEC relaxed its position
and suggested that in limited cases exchanges could operate as for-profit
organizations.91 The most serious potential competitors were foreign
exchanges that had the money, market-depth potential and technology to
compete effectively against the NYSE and other established U.S.
exchanges, but the SEC refused to grant the necessary regulatory
accommodations to allow foreign exchanges to provide services in the
United States.92
Not surprisingly, the U.S. market continues to be dominated by only
two exchanges. In 1936, the NYSE handled the trading of 85% of the
market value of all securities on organized exchanges in the United States.93
The New York Curb Exchange (later known as the American Stock
Exchange (Amex)) handled 11%.94 Today, the NYSE remains the largest
stock exchange in the United States. It handles approximately the same
share of the market as it had in 1936, and Nasdaq, which came to
prominence initially as a quotation system for over-the-counter shares, has
assumed Amex’s position as the second largest exchange in the United
States.95
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
Domestic ATSs have supplied the main competitive pressure on the
NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex to innovate and lower costs.96 As the result of the
SEC’s drive to consolidate the exchanges and ATSs into a national market
system, NYSE and Nasdaq have become public companies and sought to
merge or acquire ATSs that have developed more advanced electronic
trading platforms.97
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Fleckner, supra note 87, at 2556.
See id.
See Jackson et al., supra note 29, at 58.
Seligman, supra note 87, at 1352.
Id.
5 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2529 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2001)
(“As of 1998, the NYSE was responsible for 88 percent of the dollar value of the stocks traded on
exchanges and 87 percent of the shares traded.” (internal citations omitted)). See also WORLD
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, ANNUAL REPORT AND STATISTICS 2005 66 (2006), available at
http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/WFE%202005%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
96. See Aaron Lucchetti, Fast Lane: Firms Seek Edge Through Speed as Computer Trading
Expands, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at A1; Gaston F. Ceron, Thain Is Confident Offer for
Euronext Will Be Attractive, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2006, at C4. See also Greg Ip, Big Board
Opposes SEC Plan to Treat Alternative Trading Systems as Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,
1997, at B13.
97. Amex also is in the process of becoming a public company. See Press Release, American
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange Appoints the Investment Bank Morgan Stanley to
Assist
on
Demutualization
Plan
(Jan.
25,
2007),
available
at
http://www.amex.com/atamex/news/press/sn_Demutualize_012507.htm. Amex is also introducing

2007]A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets 151
In its 1973 Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central Market
System, the SEC stated that “the most important objective of the system is
to foster the development of strong competition among its participants.”98
To achieve this goal, Congress passed the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, authorizing the SEC to establish a “national market system.”99 The
SEC required the SROs to disclose trading information in real time and
develop electronic linkages to open up trading across markets. The
establishment of the Intermarket Trading System made cross-market trading
easier.100 The 1975 amendments also strengthened SEC control over
exchanges and placed new obligations on exchanges to regulate brokerdealers and market makers.101
Eventually, the SEC had to respond to the movement of trading volume
from the registered exchanges to the less regulated ATSs.102 ATSs allowed
investors to trade among themselves while avoiding the disclosure and
regulatory obligations imposed on the exchanges. ATSs also permitted
investors to trade directly with each other rather than only through
registered broker-dealers. When the SEC determined that market makers
were able to trade at superior prices on ATSs, creating an arbitrage
opportunity between the private ATSs and the more open exchanges, the
SEC sought to integrate ATSs into the national market system and make
quotations on ATSs publicly available.103
In thinking about how to regulate ATSs, the SEC faced a dilemma. On
one hand, ATSs were more aggressive than exchanges in investing in new
electronic trading platforms.104 They developed these sophisticated trading
systems to attract brokers and institutional investors who appreciated the
speed and efficiency in which trades could be executed on ATSs. When the
NYSE and Nasdaq recognized that they needed to upgrade their systems to
compete more effectively against ATSs, they both acquired the technology
through takeovers of the two most prominent ATSs, Archipelago and
Instinet.105
On the other hand, the SEC recognized that ATSs had certain
advantages over the exchanges, stemming from the fact that ATSs did not
a new electronic trading platform. See Aaron Lucchetti, Forgotten Amex Hopes to Erase Bad
Memories, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at C1.
98. See Seligman, supra note 87, at 1368.
99. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1.
100. See Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1085–86.
101. See Seligman, supra note 87, at 1368–69.
102. The SEC defines an ATS as “any organization, association, person, group of persons or
systems that constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together
purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(1) (2005).
103. See Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1087.
104. See, e.g., Lucchetti, supra note 96, at A1.
105. See Anderson, supra note 6, at C1.
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have to meet the same regulatory burdens. Because they were not SROs,
ATSs did not have to bear the costs of regulating their members and
customers, nor did they have to meet the same reporting requirements as
exchanges, or make their order books public.106 These advantages meant
that ATSs had lower expenses than the exchanges and investors enjoyed
lower trading costs. In addition, orders to ATSs did not have to be routed
through a registered broker-dealer, making ATSs even more attractive to
investors. Altogether the advantages enjoyed by ATSs allowed ATSs to
capture valuable order flow and meant that ATSs sometimes provided
better bid and ask prices than the exchanges.107 The SEC noted that these
advantages benefited only those investors that had access to the ATSs—
primarily institutional investors—placing smaller investors at a
disadvantage.108
In response, the SEC promulgated Regulation ATS in 1998.109 Under
Regulation ATS, the SEC required ATSs to elect between being registered
as exchanges or being treated as broker-dealers. In order to ensure the
soundness of ATSs, the regulation required ATSs to submit to various
record-keeping, notice and market surveillance requirements. As an ATS
conducted more business, it would assume additional regulatory
responsibilities, much like an exchange. In addition, Regulation ATS
imposed certain transparency and trading access requirements on ATSs. In
the case where an ATS handles a high portion of the trading volume of a
particular security, the ATS is required to report its best orders to a central
quotation system on a registered exchange.110
Regulation ATS reflected the SEC’s difficulty in deciding how to
incorporate ATSs into the national market system and to define ATSs’
relationship to exchanges. The SEC sought to strike a middle path between
allowing certain ATSs to continue to operate with light regulation and
oversight while imposing additional regulatory oversight requirements on
larger ATSs that posed a more direct competitive threat to exchanges.
Unfortunately, the degree to which certain ATSs might reach a size where

106. Fleckner, supra note 87, at 2569 (“Stock exchanges face a disadvantage insofar as the
Securities Exchange Act compels them to regulate the securities markets, while other market
organizers can free ride on the stock exchanges’ regulatory expenses.”).
107. Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1087–99 (noting that the SEC was concerned that ATSs
remained outside the scope of formal regulation).
108. See id.
109. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 3440,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3).
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they would have to comply with certain additional regulations was a source
of great confusion.111
The regulation of exchanges and ATSs in the United States culminated
in the promulgation of Regulation NMS in 2005.112 Regulation NMS
introduced several significant market reforms to strengthen the national
market system. Regulation NMS consisted of four parts: (i) the “tradethrough” or Order Protection Rule,113 (ii) the Access Rule,114 (iii) the Subpenny Rule115 and (iv) the Market Data Rules.116
The trade-through rule requires “trading centers” to ensure the
execution of a trade at the best price available on any automated trading
center. Regulation NMS defines trading centers broadly to include
exchanges, national securities associations that operate SRO trading
facilities, ATSs, exchange market-makers, over-the-counter market-makers
and any broker-dealers that execute orders internally by trading as principal
or crossing orders as agent.117 This definition tracks the MiFID terms MTFs
and systematic internalizers.118 If a trading center receives a bid where the
best offer is located at another trading center, the trading center must route
the trade to the other trading center. The trade-through rule applies,
however, only to automated trading centers. Therefore, trading centers do
not have to route trades to a trading center that cannot match a bid within
one second of receipt even if that trading center offers a better price.119 The
limitation of the trade-through rule only to automated trading centers was
the main reason why both the NYSE and American Stock Exchange moved
from exclusively floor-trading systems to hybrid trading systems.
In the SEC’s view, the trade-through rule helps accomplish three goals.
First, the trade-through rule should increase investor confidence in the
markets by ensuring that investor orders are always executed at the best
prices.120 In developing the trade-through rule, the SEC was most concerned
about the protection of retail investors, who would be vulnerable to having
their trading orders executed at inferior prices. Institutional investors, on the
other hand, generally are better informed and have more opportunities to
ensure their orders are executed at the best prices. Second, the SEC believed
111. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate
to Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 613, 665–
66 (2005).
112. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 9, 2005)
[hereinafter Regulation NMS Release].
113. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005).
114. § 242.610.
115. § 242.612.
116. §§ 242.601, .603.
117. § 242.600(b)(78).
118. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 4(1).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(b)(8) (2005).
120. See Regulation NMS Release, supra note 112, at 37,498.
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that the trade-through rule lowers trading costs and increases market
liquidity by encouraging the greater use of limit orders.121 Finally, the SEC
believed the trade-through rule would foster competition among trading
centers for orders, since orders have to be directed to whichever trading
center has the best prices.122 The trading center that offers the best price
therefore would capture trading volume, and higher trading volume would
lead to more revenue from trading fees and enough liquidity to continue to
ensure the best prices. Trading centers began complying with the tradethrough rule in March 2007.123
The access rule aims to ensure non-discriminatory access to quotations
displayed by the exchanges (but not other trading centers) by any person
seeking to obtain quotations through members, subscribers or customers of
the exchanges. Among other rules to make it easier for outsiders to access
another trading center’s quotations, Regulation NMS limits the fees charged
by trading centers for certain quotations to no more than $0.003 per
share.124
The sub-penny pricing rule prohibits market participants from
displaying or otherwise accepting quotations that are priced in units less
than $0.01.125
Finally, the market data rule changes the formula for how revenues
from market data fees are used to support SROs. The main change was to
modify the formula to ensure that SROs that provided quotation
information received more revenue.126
CONFLICTING GOALS OF THE SEC
For nearly seventy-five years, the SEC has attempted to balance three
objectives in how it regulates trading markets and broker-dealers: self
regulation, protection of retail investors and competition among trading
centers. The SEC made the decision early on to delegate regulatory
authority to the SROs. Allowing the exchanges and broker-dealers to selfregulate was initially a way of soothing opposition by the exchanges and
broker-dealers to the new agency.127 Quickly, however, the SEC embraced
self-regulation as a more effective way to regulate the activities of
exchanges and broker-dealers, as compared to direct regulation by the SEC.
121. See id. A limit order is an order to trade at the best available price, provided that the price
is worse than the limit price specified by the trader. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 73 (2003).
122. See Regulation NMS Release, supra note 112, at 37,498.
123. See Gaston F. Ceron, New Trading Rules to Launch Days After the Rout, Rollout of First
Phase To Bar “Trade Throughs”, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2007, at C3.
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610 (2005).
125. See § 242.612.
126. See Regulation NMS Release, supra note 112, at 37,503.
127. See Seligman, supra note 87, at 1351–52.
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The SEC believed the SROs to be in a superior position to regulate the
securities industry because they would be better informed about
marketplace activities, be better able to monitor and ensure the compliance
of its own members to applicable rules and regulations, and through selffinancing of regulatory activities be more capably funded.128 SROs also had
another big advantage over the SEC: SROs would not be bound by due
process standards like a government agency and therefore could act faster to
stop and punish market actors for fraud or unfairness in the marketplace.129
In the meantime, the SEC could stand back from the day-to-day regulation
of the marketplace and intervene when problems arose—a “shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with
the hope it would never have to be.”130 At times when SROs have failed to
prevent fraud or abuse, the government has tightened the leash on them,131
but the SEC remains committed to the ideal of the securities industry
regulating itself and all of the ancillary benefits.
The other objective that the SEC has consistently pursued in its
rulemaking is the protection of investors, especially retail investors. The
focus on retail investors has driven the SEC to seek greater transparency in
order books and increase public access to market data. It also led the SEC to
adopt the trade-through rule, with the rule’s emphasis on always executing
trades at the best price. The trade-through rule thus prevents trading centers
from providing services that may be especially attractive to institutional
investors and less beneficial to retail investors.
Finally, the SEC has sought to encourage greater competition among
trading centers. Pursuant to Section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act, the
SEC has viewed development of the national market system as the way of
linking all of the various U.S. trading centers in a shared order book with
cross-market order routing to ensure that trades are always completed at the
best available price.132
In attempting to create a national market system, however, the SEC has
undermined its other objective of increasing competition. Competition can
come from three directions. New trading markets can be formed, offering
customers better execution technology and charging lower trading fees. To
the extent better trading technology and lower fees are not enough, a rival
market can try to siphon off order flow by offering superior price discovery
128. See Fleckner, supra note 87, at 2582.
129. See Seligman, supra note 87, at 1361.
130. See id. (quoting JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 185 (3d
ed. 2003).
131. See, for example, the limitations imposed on SROs by the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 and the reorganization of the NASD in the 1990s. See Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1079–
82; Seligman, supra note 87, at 1369–73.
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000).
OF THE
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or particular services to institutional customers. Or, to the extent domestic
markets cannot provide adequate competition, foreign exchanges with
proven technology and better financing could be allowed to provide
services in the United States and challenge the NYSE and Nasdaq for
listings and order flow. In each case, however, regulatory barriers prevent
viable competitive pressure from being exerted from any of these
directions.
The SEC’s desire to protect the self-regulatory system and promote the
interests of retail investors has made it difficult for new entities to challenge
the dominance of the large U.S. exchanges. In the United States the NYSE
and Nasdaq dominate the trading of equity securities. They attract the
highest number of customer orders, which places them in a stronger
competitive position relative to other exchanges and ATSs. As noted
earlier, this dominance has remained constant for the past century with the
exception of Nasdaq, assuming the second-place position once held by
Amex.133
The attraction of order flow is vital to the business of an exchange.
Order flow perpetuates the attractiveness of the exchange. Increased order
flow makes the exchange more liquid. Liquidity means not only better
prices, but also faster execution of trades.134
Order flow also directly affects how much revenue the exchange can
generate. An exchange relies primarily on three sources of revenue: trading
fees, listing fees and market data fees.135 Of the three, the biggest source of
revenue is trading fees. Trading fees are the fees that an exchange charges
customers for each trade. The more order flow, the more trading fees
generated. In the year ended December 31, 2006, the NYSE reported
$675.9 million in revenue from trading fees compared to $356.1 million
from listing fees and $222.5 million from market data fees.136 Order flow
also allows the exchange to generate more listing fees and market data fees.
Listing fees are the fees paid by companies to have their securities listed on
the exchange. As order flow is a key component of liquidity, an exchange
that can attract more order flow will be an attractive exchange for
companies on which to seek a listing. Likewise, an exchange that attracts
order flow can charge more in market data fees.
It is very difficult for a competitor to dethrone an exchange once that
exchange has established itself as the dominant recipient of order flow. A
133. See supra p. 150.
134. See HARRIS, supra note 121, at 394–409.
135. See RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? 51 (1998) (stating that the main sources of
income for stock exchanges include fees for transaction-related services, listing, clearing and
settlement services, market and company news and information, and membership subscriptions).
136. NYSE Euronext, Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 80–81 (May 1, 2007). For a
description of trading fees, listing fees and market data fees, see id. at 90–92.
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competitor faces the classic chicken-and-egg problem: Bid and ask prices
superior to those offered on the established exchange may encourage more
orders, but without already existing order flow it is difficult for the
competitor to offer consistently superior prices.
The need for an exchange to register itself with the SEC is a further
hindrance to direct competition between the established exchanges and
rising ATSs. Since the 1980s, ATSs like Instinet have been quite popular
with brokers and institutional investors that appreciated the faster execution
speeds, lower trading costs and anonymity offered by the electronic trading
systems.137 ATSs also did not have to limit membership to registered
broker-dealers, giving institutional investors direct access to the trading
system and an additional way to minimize trading costs.138 As ATSs started
to handle a greater share of the trading volume for certain securities, the
SEC promulgated Regulation ATS.139 The added regulatory burden of
becoming an exchange or taking on exchange-like obligations imposed by
Regulation ATS140 undermines many of the reasons ATSs were attractive to
brokers and investors.
The second regulatory challenge to a new exchange stems from its
obligation to participate in the national market system and comply with
Regulation NMS.141 The trade-through rule in Regulation NMS has the
effect of favoring the dominant exchanges by requiring brokers to execute
trades on the exchange offering the best price. The market that handles the
greatest amount of order flow will generally be the market that offers the
best price.142 As a result, the trade-through rule perpetuates the dominant
position of the largest exchanges. The only opportunity that a new exchange
has to challenge the established exchange’s dominance is by offering other
services to customers beyond price. For example, the exchange could offer
faster execution speeds, anonymous trading or better execution certainty.
Regulation NMS’s trade-through rule, however, denies smaller exchanges
this opportunity.
Finally, the SEC has prevented foreign exchanges from offering
services directly to U.S. investors without registering as a U.S. exchange.

137. See Stoll, supra note 5, at 161; Xiang Cai, Treading Through Trade-Through: A Law and
Economics Analysis of SEC Proposed Regulation NMS (Feb. 14, 2005) (unpublished note,
Cornell Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=666962 (citing research that investor
preferences may change with market conditions and not always lie with best price).
138. See generally Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1087–89 (discussing the consequences of the
growth of ATSs in the 1990s).
139. See discussion supra pp. 151–52.
140. See supra p. 152.
141. See discussion supra pp. 152–54.
142. This point is made by Stavros Gkantinis in Regulation and Innovation: Comparing U.S.
and European Stock Trading Markets 13–14 (Harvard Law Sch. Student Scholarship Series, Paper
No. 13, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887645.
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While U.S. investors have myriad ways to buy foreign shares abroad on
foreign exchanges, foreign exchanges do not yet have the opportunity to
place trading terminals in the United States. This would make it easier for
U.S. brokers to execute trades on the foreign exchanges.143 The SEC has the
power to exempt foreign exchanges from the registration requirement, but
has chosen to do so only if and when the foreign market limits access and
trading volume.144 The result is that the NYSE and Nasdaq are insulated
from serious foreign competition.
SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASING COMPETITION
In order to facilitate greater competition among exchanges, three
changes should be made to how U.S. trading markets are regulated. First,
the operation of exchanges should be separated from their regulatory
functions. It is worth noting again that the self-regulatory obligations of an
exchange serve as an entry-barrier to new competitors. New exchanges
must build up their regulatory capacities or outsource their SRO
responsibilities to another SRO.145 But, even from the perspective of
ensuring sound regulation, it would be wise to remove from exchanges the
responsibility of regulating certain market participants. It has been noted by
several commentators that there is an inherent contradiction between the
SRO duties of an exchange and its for-profit activities.146 As an SRO, the
exchange is responsible for monitoring the activities of brokers, setting and
enforcing listing standards and guarding market integrity. As a for-profit
enterprise, however, the exchange is trying to attract brokers and issuers.
The brokers execute trades on behalf of customers and play an important
role in directing order flow to the exchange. Issuers decide where to list.
Therefore, tougher regulation of brokers and companies may have a direct
impact on the exchange’s revenue streams.147 In addition, exchanges may
be in a position of regulating their competitors. ATSs that choose to be
regulated as broker-dealers must subject themselves to oversight by an
SRO, which may be one of the exchanges.148
143. See Jackson et al., supra note 29, at 70–72.
144. See id. at 59–60 (describing the exemption order granted to Tradepoint Financial Networks
plc in 1999); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 64.
145. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000).
146. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 581–83 (2005); Onnig H. Dombalagian,
Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L.
317, 331–35 (2007); Fleckner, supra note 87, at 2590–610.
147. See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 146, at 581–83 (arguing that exchange should only be in
charge of guarding market integrity—an area where the interests of the exchange owners
correspond with the interests of the public). The NYSE attempted to address this problem by
delegating much of its regulatory oversight responsibilities to a not-for-profit subsidiary called
NYSE Regulation with a board consisting of a majority of independent directors. Id. at 597–98.
148. See Fleckner, supra note 87, at 2600.
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Second, the SEC should revisit the trade-through rule and allow trades
to be executed on the basis of criteria other than best price. The SEC chose
to define best execution by best price to protect retail investors. The
expressed concern was that retail investors would be unable to prevent
brokers from executing their trade orders at inferior prices.149 However, the
breadth of the trade-through rule harms those customers who may wish to
have their trades executed at inferior prices if it enables them to have their
trades executed more quickly or on an anonymous basis.150
Finally, the SEC should reconsider its policy regarding the placement
of foreign trading screens in the United States. There is ample evidence that
U.S. investors already actively invest in foreign securities in foreign
markets and that the prohibition on foreign trading screens serves only to
increase the cost of investing abroad.151 Instead, the SEC should consider an
alternative to full registration that would allow foreign exchanges that met
certain market-integrity and investor-protection requirements to provide
services in the United States.152
There have been several recent developments that move in the direction
suggested by this article. In November 2006, the SEC announced that the
NASD and NYSE Regulation will combine their member-regulation
functions into a single entity.153 The new entity, recently named the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),154 will be completely
independent of any exchange.155 The main purpose of the creation of this
combined regulator is to eliminate duplicate regulation of the same brokers
that handle orders on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. Also, the shifting of
certain regulatory responsibilities away from the NYSE was meant to
address concerns about potential conflicts with the exchange’s for-profit
operations.156
149. See Regulation NMS Release, supra note 112, at 37,498.
150. See discussion supra pp. 153–54.
151. See Jackson et al., supra note 29, at 73–75; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 41–42, 53.
See also Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts its Stock in Us 15–16 (Benjamin N. Cardozo
Sch. of Law, Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 176, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951705 (discussing the evidence of more U.S. investors
buying foreign securities outside of the United States).
152. Another consideration is that the failure to allow European exchanges to place trading
screens in the United States may cause the European Union to prevent U.S. exchanges and ATSs
from offering services in Europe.
153. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Statement at News Conference Announcing NYSENASD Regulatory Merger (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2006/spch112806cc.htm.
154. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-laws of NASD, SEC
Release No. 34-56145, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, at 42,170 (July 26, 2007) (noting that the NASD
would change its name to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).
155. See id. at 42,170–72 (describing the governance structure of FINRA).
156. See Consolidation of NASD with the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of the NYSE:
Working Towards Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance
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While the creation of FINRA is a significant regulatory development, it
does not fully address all of the concerns about the conflict between an
exchange’s regulatory activities and its market operations. What remains of
NYSE Regulation will continue to oversee the market integrity of the
NYSE and ensure that companies on the NYSE comply with NYSE listing
standards.157 There is still the potential that the NYSE will not vigorously
enforce its listing standards in the face of other exchanges competing for
new listings.
The SEC also is reconsidering its position regarding foreign trading
screens. In several public statements, SEC commissioners have stated that
under certain circumstances the SEC may allow foreign trading screens to
be placed in the United States.158 The likelihood of the SEC allowing
trading screens to come into the United States on a regular basis is
dependent on the SEC’s implementation of the Tafara and Peterson
proposal of substituted compliance.159
ADOPTION OF THE MIFID APPROACH
Recent statements by senior SEC officials indicate that the SEC is
receptive to rethinking how it regulates exchanges, bringing the prospect of
a mutual recognition regime with the European Union, and possibly other
jurisdictions, closer to reality.160 What is less clear from these statements is
how the SEC will accomplish this outcome and what the principles guiding
a substituted compliance regime between one or more foreign jurisdictions
will be. The MiFID offers a possible roadmap for the SEC concerning how
it should modify the U.S. regulatory environment for trading markets and
open up the U.S. market. While the complete adoption of MiFID provisions
by the United States is unwise and does not take into account the legal,
political and economic differences between the United States and the
European Union, the SEC can and should learn from the regulatory policies
effected by the MiFID.

and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Erik R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, SEC).
157. See id. (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, CEO, NYSE Regulation, Inc.).
158. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the N.Y. Soc’y of Sec. Analysts
(June 14, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch061407cc.htm
[hereinafter Cox Speech]; Roel Campos, Comm’r, SEC, Speech: SEC Regulation Outside the U.S.
(Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807rcc.htm
[hereinafter Campos Speech].
159. See discussion infra pp. 162–64.
160. See, e.g., Cox Speech, supra note 158; Campos Speech, supra note 158; Annette L.
Nazareth, Comm’r SEC, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Int’l Law (May 4, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch050407aln.htm; Sirri Speech, supra note 29. See
generally Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25.
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In particular, the MiFID offers guidance concerning how to promote
competition among trading markets and how to regulate trading markets
that operate in multiple jurisdictions. The MiFID does not impose the same
types of regulatory barriers to competition as those that exist in the U.S.
system. The MiFID does not place registration requirements on trading
platforms as does the SEC. In fact, one of the main improvements of the
MiFID over the ISD was to expand the mutual recognition passport to all
types of trading venues rather than just select regulated markets. By doing
so, the MiFID removed the main barrier to the development of competing
trading platforms.
The MiFID also avoids the linking of regulatory duties with market
operations. An example of this is the MiFID’s more flexible definition of
best execution.161 Under the MiFID, trading platforms are permitted to
tailor their services according to the sophistication of the investor.
Therefore, trading markets have the flexibility to offer services beyond best
price to institutional investors, while retail customers still retain the
protection of best price. Finally, the mutual recognition passport opened the
EU member states to exchanges from other EU member states, allowing
various European exchanges to place trading screens and offering services
directly to investors across Europe. This openness made it possible for
exchanges to compete head-to-head for listings and order flow.162 This in
turn has encouraged the consolidation of European exchanges and the
competitive innovations noted above.
The MiFID further offers a blueprint for a mutual recognition regime
between the United States and other jurisdictions. The model is the passport
concept set forth by the MiFID. In addition to mutual recognition, the
passport requires agreement on minimum standards and home country
supervision. For there to be minimum standards, there must be
harmonization of certain regulatory standards to ensure that all trading
markets satisfy and meet the same basic requirements. Only once these
minimum standards are set will it be possible to have home-country
supervision. This illustrates the need for a robust mechanism for regulatory
coordination. The Lamfalussy process offers one example of how
institutional links can be set up to provide information sharing and joint
rule-making. In this respect, the MiFID passport reflects many decades of
experience by the European Union, where aspirations for mutual
161. See discussion supra p. 144.
162. With the forthcoming implementation of the MiFID, already certain financial institutions
have announced their intention to set up new trading facilities to compete against the established
European exchanges. See Carrick Mollenkamp, LSE Could Face a New Threat, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116355086492523274.html
(describing a new trading platform being developed by Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS to trade large blocks of shares of LSElisted companies).
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recognition have been foiled by inconsistent implementation of directives
and imposition of special requirements by certain member states. The
United States should respect this experience and consider the approach laid
out in the MiFID.
SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE: CHANGE IN COURSE FOR U.S.
MARKET REGULATION?
Recently, SEC officials Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson proposed a
new regulatory framework of “substituted compliance” to allow for foreign
stock exchanges and broker-dealers to access the U.S. financial market
without registering with the SEC.163 The Tafara and Peterson article has
generated a great deal of attention because of the authors’ positions at the
SEC164 and the general endorsement of the proposal by other senior SEC
officials.165
The substituted compliance framework is substantially the same as the
mutual recognition passport used in the MiFID and the ISD.166 As described
by Tafara and Peterson, foreign exchanges and broker-dealers would be
granted an exemption from U.S. regulation, except from the anti-fraud
provisions of U.S. securities law, if the SEC determines that they are
adequately regulated by their respective home regulators. The majority of
the article is devoted to explaining how the SEC would go about
determining whether foreign securities law and regulation is “substantively
comparable” to U.S. securities law and regulation and whether the foreign
regulator has oversight powers and a regulatory and enforcement
philosophy “substantively similar” to the SEC’s.167
163. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 25.
164. Tafara is Director of the Office of International Affairs of the SEC, and Peterson is Senior
Counsel of the same office. Despite their positions with the SEC, Tafara and Peterson state that
the views expressed in their article are their personal views and do not reflect those of the SEC.
See also, e.g., Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on a Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69 (2007); Edward F.
Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 85 (2007); George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to a Blueprint
for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
99 (2007); Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
105 (2007); Floyd Norris, Should U.S. Markets Be Wide Open?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C1.
165. See Cox Speech, supra note 158; Sirri Speech, supra note 29; Jeremy Grant, SEC Could
Widen U.S. Investor Access, FIN. TIMES., Mar. 7, 2007, at 24.
166. In fact, Tafara and Peterson describe their proposal as incorporating a “bilateral mutual
recognition approach.” Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 56. Later, Tafara and Peterson argue
that substituted compliance differs from mutual recognition in that it requires “comparability of
regulatory requirements and oversight as the basis for mutual recognition.” Id. at 54 n.78. It is
unclear if there is truly a legitimate distinction. Mutual recognition, by its nature, is the product of
agreement by different legal jurisdictions and therefore must reflect some belief that the standards
of the two jurisdictions are comparable or at least comparable enough to give rise to the
agreement.
167. See id. at 32.
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According to Tafara and Peterson, the foreign exchange or brokerdealer must meet certain “exemption requirements” and, at the same time,
its home jurisdiction must meet certain “regulatory preconditions.”168 To
ensure that foreign jurisdictions maintain satisfactory regulatory standards
and oversight, Tafara and Peterson suggest a comprehensive agreement
between the United States and the foreign country.169 Tafara and Peterson
rightfully acknowledge a mutual recognition system must require on-going
monitoring of the foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, they also suggest a
reassessment of the arrangement every five years.170 Such a reassessment
period would not be a stick that the United States would use to keep other
countries in line. Rather, Tafara and Peterson envision that the benefits of
access to the U.S. market will incentivize foreign countries to improve their
own regulatory standards.171
What is striking about the Tafara and Peterson proposal is the degree to
which it borrows concepts from the MiFID and the regulatory approach of
the European Union. At the same time, the Tafara and Peterson proposal
falls short. It fails to note that the United States would need to modify its
own regulations to be more consistent with foreign regulatory systems. For
example, the separation of stock exchanges’ business operations from their
self-regulatory activities and the broadening of acceptable execution criteria
under the trade-through rule would need to be addressed.
Furthermore, the Tafara and Peterson proposal is vague about the
institutional links that must be established between the SEC and foreign
regulators. The authors are too modest to suggest that the SEC join, by
treaty, CESR or some other multilateral regulatory body172 where the
members are legally obligated to implement any joint decisions or enter into
168. See id. at 54.
169. See id. Tafara and Peterson propose the execution of a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction modeled after those entered into
between the United States and United Kingdom (Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the
Supervision of Financial Services Firms, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_multilateral/ukfsa_mou.pdf) and among the members of
the International Organization of Securities Commission (International Organization of Securities
Commission, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, May 2002, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf). It is puzzling why the authors
prefer the use of MOUs, which some countries have argued are non-binding, to provide the legal
framework for a permanent cooperative relationship between the SEC and the foreign regulator.
See, e.g., John H. McNeil, International Agreements: Recent U.S.-UK Practice concerning the
Memorandum of Understanding, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 821 (1994) (discussing the UK position in an
arbitration matter that a U.S.-UK MOU was not legally binding).
170. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 56.
171. See id. at 56–57.
172. Tafara and Peterson reject a multilateral mutual recognition regime in favor of bilateral
arrangements in order to give the SEC greater control over selecting the regimes that are deemed
most compatible with the United States. See id. at 55–56.
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an international legal regime where the rulemaking or legal interpretation
happens at the international level.173 It is more realistic to expect that the
SEC will not be able to dictate what standards must be maintained by other
countries, but rather will be forced to negotiate and compromise on
comparable standards. It is important to note that foreign markets may not
decide that market access to the United States is a vital objective, and, as
Tafara and Peterson themselves acknowledge, their proposal is driven in
part by the willingness of U.S. investors to go abroad and shed the
protections afforded by U.S. law.174
Additionally, the bilateral agreement program suggested by Tafara and
Peterson will most likely not offer the flexibility required to regulate the
fast-moving securities markets. International agreements are difficult to
draft and negotiate. It is difficult to imagine drafting and negotiating the
terms of an agreement specifying the details of how a country regulates its
exchanges and broker-dealers. Agreements, if the parties make them
binding, also share an unfortunate characteristic with EU directives in that
they will most likely not be self-executing and must be implemented into
national law and regulation. The European Union learned quite painfully
that inconsistent implementation of directives undermines the directives’
objectives.175 Similarly, there is a likely chance that the treaties will offer
little comfort to the SEC that the foreign securities law and regulation is
“substantively comparable” to U.S. securities law and regulation, and that a
given foreign regulator has oversight powers and a regulatory and
enforcement philosophy “substantively similar” to that of the SEC.
The solution is to establish an international body that will serve as a
focal point for regulatory coordination. This body will be based on treaty
law, and its decisions enforced on participating countries. In short, there
needs to be a CESR-like entity that can provide the institutional links
necessary to implement technical regulation and monitor enforcement
efforts at the national level.
CONCLUSION
The need to re-examine how the SEC regulates exchanges and other
trading markets is even more apparent in light of recently voiced concerns
about the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets.176 In light of these
173. See Eric J. Pan, Authoritative Interpretation of Agreements: Developing More Responsive
International Administrative Regimes, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (1997) (discussing the need for
self-interpreting international administrative bodies).
174. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 25, at 53.
175. See Wise Men Report, supra note 40, at 10 (noting that the development of the European
securities market was being held up by inconsistent implantation of EU directives).
176. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html; MCKINSEY & CO. WITH N.Y. CITY ECON. DEV. CORP.,
SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007),
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concerns, the task for the SEC should be two-fold: encourage U.S. stock
exchanges to become more competitive and push for greater convergence of
regulation with the European Union as well as other major financial
jurisdictions. The MiFID serves as a model for how the SEC can achieve
these two goals.
To accomplish the first goal, the SEC should expose the U.S. stock
exchanges to greater competition, both from foreign markets and other
domestic exchanges and ATSs. The SEC should revisit Regulation NMS
and to allow execution of trades on a variety of criteria other than merely
price. A trade-through rule focused on best price makes it difficult for new
trading venues to challenge the dominance of the major stock exchanges
and ignores the needs of institutional investors. These are the investors most
likely to look to, and are in the best position to take advantage of,
marketplaces outside the United States. By revising the trade-through rule,
the SEC would encourage the further growth of ATSs and regional
exchanges and increase competitive pressure on the larger stock exchanges
to innovate and improve their efficiency.
The SEC also should allow the placement of foreign-market trading
screens in the United States. The SEC has long resisted the location of
foreign trading screens in the United States without foreign exchanges first
becoming registered securities markets under SEC rules. The placement of
foreign trading screens will make it easier for U.S. investors to buy abroad,
but any costs may be outweighed by the beneficial effect on U.S. exchanges
to meet more direct foreign competition.
At the same time, introducing foreign trading screens will allow U.S.
exchanges to demand reciprocal treatment in Europe and other jurisdictions.
As foreign investors become more interested in equity securities, the SEC
should eliminate the barriers to foreign investors participating in the U.S.
markets.
The SEC also needs to push foreign regulations to converge with those
of the United States. In recognizing that U.S. investors are actively
participating in the foreign markets, the SEC’s goal should be to bring the
other markets up to U.S. standards. The SEC can achieve this goal by
devoting more resources to reaching out to foreign regulatory authorities
and looking more aggressively for ways to encourage the strengthening of
foreign rules and regulations. As an incentive to foreign regulators to work
available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/
NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE
21ST
CENTURY,
REPORT
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0703capmarketscomm.htm; Stephen Labaton,
Paulson, at Talks on Regulation, Suggests Pendulum Has Swung Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2007, at C3 (reporting on meeting of business representatives with Treasury Secretary Paulson to
discuss regulation of U.S. financial markets).
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with the SEC, the SEC can offer the prospect of establishing mutual
recognition arrangements where foreign and U.S. companies can participate
in each other’s capital markets while complying with their home
jurisdictions’ requirements. Seeking mutual recognition would mark a
major shift in SEC policy, but is an example of the type of bold policy that
must be pursued in this changing market environment.
The goal of such a project would not be to have foreign countries adopt
U.S. securities laws. Rather, the goal would be to ensure that foreign
countries adopt the substance of U.S. requirements to provide a level of
investor protection acceptable to the SEC. The United States must defend
its position as the leading securities market in the world. To do so, it must
look outward and embrace the free flow of investor capital across borders
through open competition and regulatory cooperation.

